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█ Abstract What makes one individual’s experience vicarious is that it is both similar to, and caused by, anoth-
er’s psychological state. Vicarious responses are mediated by the observation of another’s goal-directed or ex-
pressive action. While the evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests the ubiquity of vicarious responses to 
others’ goals, intentions, sensations and emotions, the question is: is the general function of vicarious responses 
to understand another’s mind? In this paper, I argue for a dual view of the function of vicarious responses: 
while empathetic responses are other-directed, contagious responses are self-centered. 
KEYWORDS: Empathy; Vicarious Responses; Action; Self; Otherness. 
 
█ Riassunto L’empatia e la disunità delle esperienze vicarie – Ciò che rende un’esperienza individuale 
un’esperienza vicaria è al contempo il suo essere simile a e causata da uno stato psicologico di un’altra persona. 
Le risposte vicarie sono mediate dall’osservazione dell’azione altrui nel suo essere diretta al raggiungimento di 
uno scopo oppure nel suo portare a espressione qualcosa. Mentre l’evidenza delle neuroscienze cognitive ci au-
torizza a pensare come ubiquitarie le risposte vicarie nei confronti di obiettivi, intenzioni, sensazioni ed emozi-
oni altrui, la questione ancora aperta è: la funzione generale delle risposte vicarie è quella di comprendere la 
mente altrui? In questo lavoro intendo proporre un duplice punto di vista sulla funzione delle risposte vicarie: 
mentre le risposte empatiche sono rivolte verso gli altri, le risposte determinate da esperienze di contagio sono 
centrate sul sé. 




THE WORD “EMPATHY” HAS BOTH an An-
cient Greek etymology and a rich philosophi-
cal pedigree. It was only introduced into Eng-
lish in the early part of the twentieth century 
as a translation of the German word Einfüh-
lung, often used by philosophers in associati-
on with the word Verstehen.  
 In the context of the German hermeneu-
tical tradition (including the Phenomenolo-
gical tradition), which advocated the metho-
dological duality between the Geisteswissen-
schaften (the sciences of the mind) and the na-
tural sciences, both words were meant to re-
fer to the distinctive kind of (non-scientific) 
understanding involved in making sense of 
human actions and in grasping the contents 
of human minds and the meaning and signi-
ficance of human texts and works of art.1 
There are currently two main approaches 
to empathetic phenomena, which are the 
focus of much attention in both the philoso-
phy of mind and social cognitive neuro-
science: the direct perception approach2 and 
the simulation-based approach to third-
person mindreading.3 While the former cons-
trues empathetic experiences on the model of 
perceptual experiences, the latter construes 
them as vicarious experiences. 
Studi 
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Since I find it unnecessarily contentious to 
assume that one could perceive the content and 
character of another’s affective state, I assume 
that empathetic experiences are vicarious 
responses to others’ affective states, not percep-
tual experiences of others’ affective states.4 
I further assume that what makes an expe-
rience vicarious is that it is both similar to, and 
caused by, another’s psychological state. In 
other words, to empathize is to share to some 
extent another’s affective state. But as I will ar-
gue, there are some fundamental distinctions 
between the affective or emotional experience 
of one individual and that of another individual 
who empathizes with the former.5 
Vicarious experiences are puzzling. A vi-
carious response resembles the experience 
that caused it, but the agent whose experi-
ence caused it did not intend to cause it or to 
share her experience with some addressee by 
having him recognize her communicative in-
tention. In a nutshell, a vicarious response is 
not the output of an intentional communica-
tive action between a communicator and her 
addressee (in Grice’s sense). So the first ques-
tion is: what is the mechanism causing vi-
carious experiences? 
Among advocates of the simulation ap-
proach to vicarious experiences, one recent 
influential answer is: mirroring. One conse-
quence of the discovery of mirror neurons 
has been the tendency to overestimate the 
unity of vicarious experiences. But this is a 
mistake: hence the title of the present paper. 
While empathetic experiences are vicarious 
experiences, not all vicarious experiences are 
empathetic. Contagious responses to others’ 
affective states are not empathetic responses, 
but they are also vicarious experiences. So the 
second question arises: what distinguishes 
empathetic from contagious responses? 
In the first section of the paper, I offer an 
imagination-based account of the nature of 
vicarious experiences and argue that in the 
case of vicarious experiences of pain, unlike 
contagious responses, empathetic responses 
to another’s pain must satisfy five distinct 
conditions: the affectivity condition, the in-
terpersonal similarity condition, the causal 
condition, the ascription condition and the 
care condition. In a nutshell, I argue that 
while contagious pain is self-centered, em-
pathetic pain is other-directed. 
In the rest of the paper, I examine Vitto-
rio Gallese’s competing account of empathy, 
which he calls “embodied simulation”. Galle-
se’s embodied simulation approach rests on 
three fundamental assumptions, the first of 
which is the thesis of the unity of vicarious 
experiences, i.e., the assumption that all vi-
carious experiences are the output of proces-
ses of mirroring. The second assumption, 
which is accepted by most simulation-based 
approaches to mindreading others’ affective 
states, is that empathy is the default response 
to one’s awareness of another’s affective sta-
te. The third assumption, which is contenti-
ous among simulation-based approaches to 
mindreading, is that mirroring, which enab-
les one individual to share a psychological 
state with someone else is sufficient for 
ascribing it to him or her. 
In the second section, I call into question 
the second and third assumptions of embo-
died simulation. In the third section, I call 
into question the thesis of the unity of vicari-
ous experiences and argue that much of the 
evidence for vicarious motor activities, vi-
carious tactile experiences and vicarious ex-
periences of disgust is best construed as self-
centered contagious responses, not as other-
directed empathetic responses. 
 
█ The puzzle of empathetic pain 
 
█ Physical and vicarious pain 
 
A proper account of empathetic pain must 
be consistent with the fact that an empathetic 
response to another’s pain is different from the 
pain that caused it. It is also different from con-
tagious pain, from a sympathetic response to 
another’s pain and from a non-empathetic 
ascription of pain to someone else. 
I feel physical pain in my left ankle becau-




pain, then you feel vicarious pain: you share 
my pain to some extent (but only to some ex-
tent). Unless you and I shared my left ankle, 
you cannot experience my pain. My physical 
pain and your empathetic pain are not two 
different tokens of one and the same type of 
painful experience. My physical pain is 
caused by injury to my left ankle. Your vi-
carious pain is caused by your awareness of 
my physical pain. Since you share to some ex-
tent my pain in my left ankle, your vicarious 
experience of pain and my physical pain are 
similar to some extent. They are also dissimi-
lar since your vicarious experience of pain is 
caused by my physical pain and not vice-
versa. I would feel pain in my left ankle whe-
ther or not you experienced vicarious pain. 
But you would not experience vicarious pain 
unless I felt physical pain. 
All empathetic experiences are vicarious 
experiences, but not all vicarious experiences 
are empathetic experiences. For example, 
when one individual catches another’s fear as 
in crowd panic (as one catches the common 
cold), and thereby comes to share to some 
extent the latter’s fear, the former’s vicarious 
experience of fear need not be empathetic: it 
is a vicarious experience of fear generated by 
a process of emotional or affective contagion, 
i.e., a vicarious experience of contagious fear, 
not empathetic fear. Similarly, awareness of 
my pain in my left ankle could cause someone 
else to catch a vicarious experience of contagi-
ous pain, not to experience empathetic pain. 
Arguably what distinguishes an empathe-
tic response from a contagious response to 
another’s affective state is that while the 
former is other-directed, the latter is self-
centered. Empathizing involves ascribing so-
me affective state to another (and thereby 
understanding another’s psychological state). 
Catching another’s affect by a process of con-
tagion causes one to prepare for the typical 
behavioral consequences of the affect, not to 
ascribe the affective state to another. 
Thus, we need to distinguish not only ex-
periences of physical pain from vicarious ex-
periences of pain, but also between at least 
two sorts of vicarious experiences of pain: 
empathetic pain and contagious pain. As the 
neuroscientific study of pain shows, physical 
pain has two neurological components: a sen-
sorimotor component (recruiting the primary 
and secondary somatosensory areas, as well 
as the posterior insula) and an affective com-
ponent (recruiting the anterior insula, the an-
terior cingulated cortex, the thalamus, and 
the brain stem).  
The primary somatosensory cortex (SI) 
underlying the sensorimotor component of 
pain has a somatotopic organization: diffe-
rent regions of SI are activated according to 
whether one’s pain is located in e.g. one’s 
hand, foot or mouth. While the sensorimotor 
component underlies the experience of the 
intensity and the bodily location of pain, the 
affective component underlies the un-
pleasantness of painful experiences. 
Arguably all painful experiences, whatever 
their different bodily locations and intensities, 
share a characteristic feeling of global bodily 
unpleasantness.6 Further neuroscientific evi-
dence shows that when people experience vi-
carious pain as a result of being aware of 
another’s pain, only one of the two compo-
nents of standard pain (the sensorimotor or 
the affective component) is primarily active. 
 
█ Contagious and empathetic pain 
 
Contagious (or sensorimotor vicarious) 
pain is primarily generated by the activity of 
the sensorimotor component of the pain sys-
tem. It is best illustrated by evidence re-
ported by Avenanti et al.7 showing that the 
observation of another’s right hand deeply 
penetrated by a needle causes muscle-specific 
inhibition in the participants’ right hand and 
a generalized increase of corticospinal exci-
tability in their left hand.8 
In these experiments, participants saw vi-
deo-clips of another’s right hand without 
being provided with any information about 
the identity of the owner of the hand. These 
findings strongly suggest that the experience 
of contagious pain, caused by the perception 
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of another’s bodily part being subjected to 
painful stimulation, consists in imagining the 
sensorimotor consequences of painful stimu-
lation at the very same location on one’s own 
body at some future time.9 Thus, the percep-
tion of another’s right hand subjected to pain-
ful stimulation seemed to cause participants, 
not to care about another’s pain, but to auto-
matically prepare themselves for future pain 
at the same location on their own body. 
Empathetic pain is primarily generated by 
the activity of the affective component of the 
pain system. Relevant experimental evidence, 
based on functional brain imaging (fMRI), 
shows that the affective component of pain 
can be selectively activated when people are 
made aware of others’ painful experiences. 
For instance, Singer et al.10 showed partici-
pants an arrow indicating that their beloved 
partner was being inflicted a painful stimu-
lus. They report activation only in the affec-
tive component of pain (the anterior cingula-
ted cortex and the bilateral anterior insula), 
not in the sensorimotor component.11 
Unlike the sensorimotor component (es-
pecially the primary somatosensory cortex), 
the affective component of pain lacks a so-
matotopic organization. Further experiments 
based on brain-imaging in which participants 
saw either the facial expression of pain12 or 
even videos of detailed painful situations, 
such as a finger or a foot crushed by a door13, 
were also reported to cause the selective acti-
vation of the affective component of pain 
without any somatotopic effect. 
Thus, unlike the activity of the senso-
rimotor component of pain, the selective ac-
tivity of the affective component of pain does 
not reflect the bodily location of pain. 
Furthermore, while Avenanti et al. stressed 
the automaticity of the ‘somatomotor con-
tagion’ underlying the corticospinal inhibiti-
on, 14 other findings also show that the selec-
tive activity of the affective component of 
pain in participants aware of others’ pain is 
subject to top down modulation by a wide 
range of contextual parameters.15 
For example, Singer et al.16 report reduced 
activity in the affective component of pain in 
male (not female) participants when they are 
made aware of the pain of someone who was 
previously unfair to them. Cheng et al.17 re-
port reduced activity in the affective compo-
nent of pain in medical practitioners aware 
of the pain of others. Lamm et al.18 report re-
duced activity of the affective component of 
pain in participants who believe that another’s 
pain results from a useful treatment or that 
the injured bodily part has been anesthetized. 
Caring seems necessary for empathizing with 
another’s pain. But caring might require 
overriding empathizing with another’s pain if 
her pain is perceived as a necessary step for 
her recovery. 
The next step is to try and offer a plausib-
le psychological model of the brain processes 
underlying both kinds of vicarious experi-
ence of pain: empathetic pain and contagious 
pain. One plausible candidate is the kind of 
non-propositional imagination that Goldman19 
calls enactive imagination (or E-imagination) 
that has been surmised to underlie the expe-
rience of visual imagery (and motor ima-
gery). In visual imagery, one visualizes some-
thing or imagines seeing something. When 
taken on-line, one’s visual system takes re-
tinal stimulation as inputs and produces vi-
sual percepts.  
According to an influential proposal, vi-
sual imagery results from taking one’s visual 
system off-line and giving it inputs from me-
mory instead of retinal inputs. Similarly, one 
can E-imagine being in pain by taking one’s 
own pain system off-line and giving it inputs 
from memory: experiencing vicarious pain is 
the output of a process of E-imagining being 
in pain by running off-line one’s own pain 
system. 
Furthermore, as the evidence reviewed 
above shows, there are two distinct ways one 
can run one’s own pain system off-line: one 
can E-imagine being in pain by running off-
line primarily either the sensorimotor or the 
affective component of one’s pain system. 
The output of E-imagining being in pain by 




nent of one’s pain system is the experience of 
vicarious sensorimotor pain, i.e., contagious 
pain. The output of E-imagining being in pain 
by running off-line the affective component of 
one’s pain system is the experience of vicari-
ous affective pain, i.e., empathetic pain. 
Unlike contagious pain, empathetic pain 
involves understanding another’s pain by ascri-
bing pain to him or her. The fact that empathe-
tic pain involves pain-ascription is deeply puzz-
ling. Both empathetic pain and contagious pain 
are vicarious experiences of pain. To experi-
ence vicarious pain of either kind is to share to 
some extent another’s pain. Sharing another’s 
pain is to feel pain of some sort. 
There are two joint puzzles. The first one 
is: how could feeling pain result in ascribing 
pain to another? How does feeling (vicari-
ous) pain give rise to believing that another 
feels pain? The second one is: experiencing 
pain is costly. If understanding another’s 
painful experience can be achieved by execut-
ing a standard task of mindreading without 
experiencing pain, why should a mindreader 
assume the additional burden of experien-
cing pain? What is the function of the experi-
ence of pain in a task of pain ascription? 
In line with a couple of previous papers, I 
offer the following tentative answer to the 
first puzzle.20 In feeling either physical pain 
or even contagious pain, the sensorimotor 
component of one’s pain system is activated 
and pain is assigned some definite bodily lo-
cation either now or in the near future. But 
what underlies empathetic pain is primarily 
the activity of the affective component of 
one’s pain system. The experience of un-
pleasantness in turn generates sensorimotor 
expectations, which in the case of empathetic 
pain, remain unfulfilled. (Activity of the af-
fective component of the pain system is cor-
related with a global bodily feeling of un-
pleasantness, but pain is assigned no definite 
bodily location). 
As a way towards resolving the mismatch 
between the sensorimotor expectations of 
pain and the lack of sensorimotor activity, 
one takes another’s physical pain as the cause 
of one’s own psychological disarray and is 
thereby led to ascribe pain to another. Unlike 
contagious pain, empathetic pain requires 
the cognitive resources of mindreading (or 
ascribing pain to another). In response to the 
second puzzle, one may just ascribe pain to 
someone in pain if one does not care about 
her pain; but one empathetically ascribes 
pain to someone else when one cares for her 
pain. To sum up, empathetic pain satisfies 
five necessary conditions: 
 
(1) Like all vicarious experiences, it satisfies 
the interpersonal similarity condition: your 
empathetic pain resembles to some extent 
(but only to some extent) my physical pain 
in my left ankle. 
 
(2) It satisfies the causal condition: one 
respect in which your vicarious experience 
of pain differs from my physical pain is that 
the latter causes the former (and not vice-
versa).21  
 
(3) It satisfies the affectivity condition: what 
makes your vicarious experience of pain 
empathetic is that it enables you to share 
the unpleasantness (i.e., the affective quali-
ty) of my physical pain. Sharing some of 
my psychological states devoid of any af-
fective quality (e.g. one of my goals or be-
liefs) would not make your vicarious expe-
rience empathetic. 
 
(4) It satisfies the ascription condition: my 
physical pain may cause you to imagine 
pain at a definite location on your own bo-
dy in the future. But if so, then you would 
experience contagious pain, not empathetic 
pain, and you would thereby fail to ascribe 
pain to me. As it turns out, there is a signi-
ficant difference between empathetically 
and non empathetically ascribing pain to 
someone else. But unless an individual can 
mindreading another’s pain, he or she 
could not empathize with another’s pain. 
 
(5) It satisfies the care condition: the evi-
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dence suggests that unlike contagious 
pain, empathetic pain is subject to modu-
lation by top down factors. Empathy is 
not the default response to one’s awaren-
ess of another’s affective state: caring 
about another’s psychological life is ne-
cessary for empathizing.22 
 
█ Replies to Joel Smith 
 
In an interesting unpublished paper, Joel 
Smith has offered a critique of both the 
causal and the care conditions.23 The causal 
condition is meant to discriminate empathe-
tic pain (which is a special case of vicarious 
pain) from physical pain, including cases in 
which two individuals may simultaneously 
and coincidentally feel physical pain as a re-
sult of some common cause.24  
Joel Smith imagines two individuals A 
and B in the following scenario: while A is in 
the waiting room of the pain-lab, B has been 
led off into the occluded and sound-proofed 
room to be delivered electric shocks. Suppose 
A simulates B’s pain. Joel Smith argues that 
in this case, we should be inclined to say that 
A empathizes with B. But since B is in an oc-
cluded and sound-proofed room, A’s vicari-
ous experience cannot be caused by B’s pain. 
For three reasons it is difficult to know whe-
ther Joel Smith provides a genuine counter-
example to the causal condition.  
First, if A imagines the sensorimotor con-
sequences of painful stimulation at a specific 
location on his own body in the future by 
running off-line the sensorimotor compo-
nent of his pain system, then A feels contagi-
ous pain, not empathetic pain. In this case, it 
is unlikely that A would ascribe pain to B. 
Secondly, A can only empathize with B’s 
pain if B does feel physical pain. If B fails to 
feel pain either because, contrary to A’s ex-
pectation, B is not being delivered electric 
shocks or because unknown to A, B has been 
anesthetized, then A would mis-empathize 
with B.  
Finally, A may correctly or incorrectly 
ascribe pain to B on the basis of A’s know-
ledge of the situation, independently of whe-
ther or not A’s awareness of B’s condition 
causes A to feel vicarious pain. 
The care condition is meant to reflect the 
fact that, unlike sensorimotor vicarious (or 
contagious) pain, which is automatically trig-
gered by the perception of a bodily part sub-
mitted to painful stimulation, affective vi-
carious (or empathetic) pain is subject to se-
veral top-down modulating factors and is 
therefore not the default response to one’s 
awareness of another’s affective state.  
Empathetic responses (i.e. activity of the 
affective component of the pain matrix) are 
reduced in medical practitioners, in people 
who believe that another’s pain is part of a 
treatment, and in human males, not human 
females, when they are aware of the pain of 
unfair players.  
Arguably these findings do not rule out 
the possibility that empathy is the default 
response to one’s awareness of another’s pain 
that needs to be inhibited in special circum-
stances. However, Lamm et al. used fMRI to 
assess how healthy participants would res-
pond to the pain of atypical neurological pa-
tients who they were told feel pain when they 
are softly touched, but not when they are 
submitted to surgical operations. 25  
Lamm et al. report that participants dis-
played activity in the affective component of 
pain when they saw a patient’s hand being 
touched with a cotton swab but not when 
they saw it submitted to a needle injection.26 
Participants would automatically experience 
physical pain if one of their own hands were 
penetrated by a needle, not softly touched. 
The evidence further shows that they would 
also automatically feel contagious pain upon 
seeing another’s hand penetrated by a needle, 
not softly touched.27  
The fact that participants displayed em-
pathy in response to perceiving a neurologi-
cal patient’s hand softly touched, not penet-
rated by a needle, is hard to reconcile with 
the view that empathetic pain is the default 
response to one’s awareness of another’s pain 




█ Why simulation is not sufficient for as-
cription 
 
So far I have argued that both empathetic 
and contagious responses to another’s affec-
tive state are vicarious experiences, both of 
which meet the interpersonal similarity con-
dition. But only the former, not the latter, are 
other-directed and contribute to under-
standing another’s psychological state. By 
catching contagious pain, one anticipates the 
sensorimotor consequences of one’s own fu-
ture pain on one’s own body. By feeling con-
tagious disgust, one learns about potentially 
dangerous food and substances for one’s own 
sake. By feeling contagious touch, one pre-
pares oneself for the tactile consequences of 
one’s own future manipulation of the target 
of a goal-directed action.  
 
█ A mirroring account of empathy 
 
One major competing approach to em-
pathy is the embodied simulation approach 
advocated by Gallese, according to which 
empathy is the output of mirroring proces-
ses.28 The notion of a mirroring process is a 
generalization of mirror neuron activity. Gal-
lese was one of the co-discoverers of mirror 
neurons whose activity was first recorded in the 
ventral premotor cortex and subsequently in 
the inferior parietal lobule of macaque mon-
keys. Mirror neurons fire both when an animal 
performs a transitive goal-directed action and 
when it observes another execute the same 
kind of action.29 Thus, action-mirroring (i.e. 
mirror neuron activity in an observer’s brain) is 
a covert vicarious motor response to another’s 
overt goal-directed action.30  
By mirroring an agent’s goal-directed ac-
tion, an observer is taken to share the agent’s 
goal (or intention) by means of the following 
two steps: first, the perception of an agent’s 
goal-directed action causes the observer to 
covertly replicate (without executing) the 
agent’s bodily movements. Secondly, by 
covertly replicating the agent’s bodily move-
ments, the observer comes to share (or simula-
te) the agent’s goal or intention. 
Clearly, the two-step model of action-
mirroring meets the interpersonal similarity 
condition on empathy. But sharing an agent’s 
goal or intention fails to satisfy the affectivity 
condition necessary for empathy (cf. section 
1). What makes, however, the mirroring ap-
proach to empathy attractive is its parsi-
mony: it is parsimonious in two fundamental 
respects. 
First of all, mirroring processes are parsi-
monious in the sense that the very same pro-
cesses at work in the execution of action 
seem sufficient to account for the perception 
and understanding of actions executed by 
others. Secondly, the two-step model easily 
applies to an observer’s response to an 
agent’s expressive action: first, the perception 
of an agent’s expressive action causes the ob-
server to covertly replicate (without execut-
ing) the agent’s facial and/or bodily move-
ments. Secondly, by covertly replicating the 
agent’s facial and/or bodily movements, the 
observer comes to share the agent’s emotion 
or affective state. Thus, by enabling one indi-
vidual to share (or simulate) another’s affec-
tive state, mirroring processes seem to have 
the resources for generating vicarious experi-
ences that meet the affectivity condition. 
As Gallese and Goldman quickly recog-
nized, mirroring processes are naturally cons-
trued as instances of simulation processes. 
They further argued that the function of ac-
tion-mirroring is to mindread another’s in-
tention (and that action-mirroring is therefo-
re other-directed and not self-centered) when 
they entertained the cautious hypothesis that 
the mirror mechanism might be «a primitive 
version, or possibly a precursor in phylogeny, 
of a simulation heuristic that might underlie 
mindreading».31   
Although Gallese and Goldman’s hypo-
thesis was restricted to mindreading the in-
tentions of agents’ of goal-directed actions, it 
easily extends to mindreading the emotions 
or affective states of agents’ of expressive ac-
tions. Thus, they suggested that the output of 
mirroring could fit both the affectivity condi-
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tion and the interpersonal similarity conditi-
on. Whether it could further meet the ascrip-
tion condition is the basic question of the 
next sub-section. 
In accordance with the interpersonal si-
milarity condition on empathy, all simulation 
approaches to mindreading others’ affective 
states tend to assume that empathizing is the 
default response to one’s awareness of 
another’s affective state. For example, Gold-
man, who holds that «the term “empathize” 
[is] roughly equivalent to “simulate” (in an 
inter-subjective fashion)», also holds that 
«empathy is a key to mindreading […] the 
most common form of mindreading».32  
There is room for disagreement with 
Goldman on both scores here. On the one 
hand, as I argued in section 1, the evidence 
that supports the care condition on empathy 
also shows that empathetic pain is not the 
default response to another’s pain: one does 
not always empathize with the pains of 
others, whoever they are and in every 
context. On the other hand, one can form the 
belief that an individual is in pain on the ba-
sis of cues afforded by his or her expressive 
behavior and thereby ascribe pain to him or 
her without sharing his or her pain, i.e. wit-
hout meeting the interpersonal similarity 
condition on empathy. 
 
█ Mirroring and the ascription condition on 
empathy 
 
As I argued in section 1, one outstanding 
puzzle raised by a proper account of the dis-
tinction between contagious and empathetic 
responses to another’s pain is that only the lat-
ter satisfies the ascription condition. While all 
simulation-based approaches stand in contrast 
to theory-theory approaches, they also depart 
from one another in at least three respects.  
While Goldman grants priority to first-
person mindreading over third-person min-
dreading, Gordon and Hurley do not.33 
Goldman further advocates a two-tiered si-
mulation approach to mindreading, based on 
the distinction between two kinds of mental 
simulation processes: enactment imagination 
(or E-imagination) and mirroring.34 He ar-
gues that while the former underlies high-
level mindreading tasks, the latter underlies 
low-level mindreading tasks.35 Finally, while 
Goldman construes mental simulation as on-
ly one step in the process of mindreading, 
Gallese’s embodied simulation account is 
committed to the thesis that mirroring is 
both necessary and sufficient for mindrea-
ding others’ intentions and affective states. I 
now focus on the third disagreement 
between Goldman and Gallese.36 
According to Goldman’s two-tiered simu-
lation-based approach to mindreading, it is 
necessary but not sufficient for process P to 
simulate process P* that the former duplica-
tes or resembles the latter, because unlike 
duplication (or resemblance), simulation is 
not symmetrical.37 P can only simulate P* if it 
is one of P’s functions to duplicate or re-
semble P*. In the context of tasks of mindre-
ading, mental process P simulates mental 
process P* only if P produces an output (i.e., 
a mental state) whose function is to duplicate 
(or resemble) the mental state generated by 
P* and furthermore P’s output is ascribed by 
the mindreader to her target. 
Thus, for two related reasons, Goldman’s 
approach to third-person mindreading is not a 
pure simulation account.38 First, as Goldman’s 
paradigm example of a simulation process 
(i.e., the simulation of another’s decision) il-
lustrates, when I use my own decision mecha-
nism in order to simulate your decision, I must 
select a pretend belief-desire pair that will ser-
ve as input to my decision mechanism.  
While the simulation stage consists in 
running one’s decision mechanism off-line 
(whose output is a pretend decision), the 
process whereby the pretend belief-desire 
pair is selected cannot be a simulation pro-
cess. Secondly, the simulation stage is follo-
wed by a distinct projection stage whereby the 
mindreader ascribes to the target the result 
of the simulation stage. 
Gallese and Goldman can agree that the 




applies to both goal-directed and expressive 
actions: they agree that mirroring can enable 
an observer to share either the agent’s inten-
tion or the agent’s affective state. But they 
disagree over whether mirroring is sufficient 
for mindreading another’s intention or affec-
tive state, i.e. for ascribing either an intention 
or an affective state to someone else.  
While Goldman has argued that a mirro-
ring event can cause, but not constitute, a 
mindreading event, Gallese and Sinigaglia 
explicitly argue for the stronger claim that 
embodied simulation alone suffices for min-
dreading another’s intention, sensation (e.g., 
touch) or emotion (e.g., disgust).39 Their 
conception of embodied simulation combi-
nes Hurley’s re-use conception of simulation 
and Goldman and de Vignemont’s approach 
to embodied cognition further elaborated by 
Goldman.40 In what follows, I will ignore the 
second embodied component of their view.41 
Gallese and Sinigaglia endorse Hurley’s 
claim that “re-use“, not similarity (or re-
semblance), is «the core generic sense of 
process-driven simulation».42 In her critique 
of Goldman’s similarity-based notion of si-
mulation, Hurley usefully draws attention to 
the fact that similarity can apply to either 
mental processes or their outcomes (i.e., 
mental states) and that the relevant dimensi-
on of similarity between either mental pro-
cesses or mental states can be either interper-
sonal or intrapersonal.43 The first question 
for embodied simulation is: to what extent is 
re-use the core notion of simulation in the 
context of mindreading? 
In Hurley’s terms, each brain must be able 
to re-use mirror neuron activity in both the 
execution and the perception of action. She 
further saddles the simulation approach to 
mindreading with the assumption that 
«mindreading aims at simulation of, and 
hence, matching the target’s mental states».44 
But she thereby inverts the respective func-
tions of simulation and mindreading.  
While matching or duplicating the tar-
get’s mental state is the function of mental 
simulation, it is not the function of mindrea-
ding. The function of mindreading is to 
ascribe a mental state to the target. Nor 
could mental simulation be said to generate 
«information about a process» by «re-using 
that very process, as opposed to by theorizing 
about the process»:45 in the context of using 
mental simulation for tasks of third-person 
mindreading, the relevant information to be 
captured is information about another’s 
mental state, not about the simulation pro-
cess itself.46 The simulation process is a me-
ans for the goal of ascribing a mental state to 
another individual. 
As Goldman has observed, within simula-
tion-based approaches to mindreading, there 
is no room for an interpersonal notion of re-
use.47 Presumably re-using a mental state 
would require using twice the same mental 
state token. (Using or re-using a mental state 
type does not seem to make sense). But since 
the mental state that is the output of a pro-
cess of mental simulation is token-distinct 
from the target’s state that it duplicates or 
matches, in generating the former, the min-
dreader cannot re-use the latter. Thus, Hur-
ley’s notion of re-use naturally applies not to 
mental states themselves, but to mental or 
cognitive mechanisms (or capacities). While 
re-use of a single cognitive mechanism (or int-
rapersonal similarity at different times) may be 
a necessary condition, it cannot be a sufficient 
condition, of interpersonal similarity of mental 
states, which is a necessary step for any de-
fensible version of the simulation approach to 
third-person mindreading: one and the same 
cognitive mechanism (e.g. the visual system, 
the human language faculty, or the mindrea-
ding system) can obviously be used on several 
occasions to generate distinct mental states.48 
The challenge for Gallese and Sinigaglia is 
to show that the process of embodied simula-
tion that underlies a mirroring event can also 
constitute, and not merely cause, a mindrea-
ding event.49 Whether embodied simulation is 
construed in terms of re-use (or intrapersonal 
similarity) or in terms of interpersonal simila-
rity, mirroring can at best enable an observer 
of an action performed by another to share 
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either the agent’s intention or the agent’s af-
fective state. So the challenge for Gallese and 
Sinigaglia is to fill the gap between sharing 
another’s intention, sensation or emotion and 
attributing an intention, sensation or emotion 
to someone. To share another’s intention, sen-
sation or emotion is to have an intention, sen-
sation or emotion. But to ascribe an intention, 
sensation or emotion to another is to believe 
(or judge) that another has an intention, sen-
sation or emotion. 
To meet this challenge, Gallese and 
Sinigaglia argue that attribution can be under-
stood in two ways: either representationally or 
functionally. As I understand it, a representa-
tional attribution of an intention to an agent is 
a meta-representation of the agent’s intention, 
i.e., a belief about the agent’s intention. As I 
understand it, to perform a functional attribu-
tion of an intention to an agent is just to form 
the same intention as the agent, which enables 
the attributor «to deal with the agent by vir-
tue of its being appropriately related to that 
agent’s […] intention», where «this appropri-
ateness is higher the more the attributor and 
the target share the same kind of neural struc-
tures and cognitive resources».50  
I think this distinction faces two prob-
lems. First of all, to functionally attribute an 
intention to another suspiciously looks like 
sharing another’s intention. If so, then the 
claim that embodied simulation constitutes a 
functional attribution of an intention, sensa-
tion or emotion to another seems to concede 
that it is not a genuine attribution. Secondly, 
sharing a joint goal in the sense of “functio-
nal attribution” seems to «enable one to deal 
with an agent by virtue of being appropria-
tely related to that agent’s goal». 51 
Now the ability to share a joint goal and 
to engage in joint action with another has be-
en highlighted by Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, and Moll as a uniquely human 
cognitive and motivational capacity, not 
shared by non-human primates.52 If so, then 
mirror neuron activity would not seem suffi-
cient to support sharing a joint goal and en-
gaging in joint action. In fact, it seems to me 
that establishing a joint goal and fulfilling it 
by successfully executing a joint action requi-
re for each agent not only to track and min-
dread the other’s motivational and epistemic 
states and to construe them as putative 
reasons for her action, but also to engage in 
communicative action.  
If this is correct, then far from being 
achieved by mirror neuron activity, functio-
nal attribution (exemplified by sharing a 
joint goal) seems to rely on, and require, re-
presentational attributions of mental states 
to others. 
 
█ Self-centered vicarious responses 
 
In section 2, I challenged the claim that 
embodied simulation can meet the ascription 
condition on empathy. In the present section, 
I am going to challenge directly the assump-
tion of the unity of vicarious experiences. As 
the example of vicarious pain from section 1 
shows, there are at least two kinds of vicari-
ous responses to another’s physical pain: em-
pathetic and contagious responses.  
Empathetic pain is a vicarious affective 
response to another’s pain and it is other-
directed. Contagious pain is a vicarious sen-
sorimotor response to another’s pain and it is 
self-centered. In this section, I will argue that 
much evidence for vicarious experiences is 
best construed as evidence for self-centered, 
not other-directed vicarious experiences. I 
will start with some evidence about action-
mirroring. 
 
█ Vicarious motor activities 
 
With respect to the evidence for vicarious 
motor activities, two major questions arise, 
the first of which is that it is sometimes diffi-
cult to disentangle genuine instances of vi-
carious motor activities from instances of 
non-vicarious motor activities. The second 
problem is whether the function of vicarious 
motor activities in an observer’s brain is 
other-directed or self-centered. I turn to the 




One possible instance of a confusion 
between non-vicarious and vicarious motor 
activities is the recent claim that there exist 
mirror neurons that fire both when a monkey 
looks in a direction favored by these neurons 
and also when the animal sees another mon-
key looking in the same direction. Sheperd et 
al. have recently recorded the activity of neu-
rons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of 
rhesus macaques during a task in which the 
recorded animal performed a saccadic eye-
movement to a peripheral target either to its 
left or to its right, after seeing a picture of a 
monkey face whose gaze was averted to one 
of the two locations.53  
Thus, monkeys performed saccadic eye-
movements to a target whose location could 
be either congruent or incongruent with the 
direction of gaze of another monkey display-
ed in the picture. Sheperd et al. report that 
congruent gaze shifts were significantly faster 
than incongruent ones and that the firing ra-
te of some LIP neurons increased following 
presentation of the monkey face gazing to-
ward the neurons’ own receptive fields (RF, 
i.e., the direction of gaze preferred by the 
neurons). Sheperd et al. present their results 
as evidence for mirror neurons for shared at-
tention:  
 
neurons mirrored observed attention by 
firing both when the subject looked in the 
preferred direction of the neuron, and 
when observed monkeys looked in the 
preferred direction of the neuron, despite 
the irrelevance of the monkey images to 
the task.54 
 
But what the results seem to show instead 
is that the speed and firing rate of LIP neu-
rons during the execution of a gaze-shift to-
wards their preferred RF are being modulated 
by the observation of another’s averted gaze 
towards the same or the opposite location. 
Evidence that neural activity during the exe-
cution of a saccade is modulated by the de-
tection of the direction of another’s eye-gaze 
is not evidence for mirroring of another’s ga-
ze shift (or for vicarious motor response to 
another’s gaze shift). This interpretation of 
the findings by Sheperd et al. is consistent 
with other findings based on fMRI by 
Newman-Norlund et al., showing activation 
of the human mirror system for complemen-
tary (not replicative) actions.55 
I now turn to the second issue. Gallese 
and Goldman argued that the function of ac-
tion-mirroring is to mindread another’s in-
tention.56 They linked the mirror mechanism 
to the simulation approach to mindreading, 
thereby stressing the synchronous interperso-
nal neural similarity between the agent’s and 
the observer’s brains as a step in the process 
whereby the observer ascribes an intention to 
the agent.  
While it is clear that action-mirroring is a 
vicarious motor activity and that vicarious 
motor activity can prepare the observer for 
future actions, it is controversial whether it is 
other-directed and promotes social under-
standing.57 First, is at best unclear whether 
macaque monkeys ascribe intentions to 
others. Secondly, covert motor activities 
caused by another’s overt action might be 
evidence that the observer is preparing some 
complementary action, not duplicating the 
agent’s overt action.58 In which case, these 
covert motor activities would not meet the 
definition of either action-mirroring or vi-
carious motor activities.59 
Because they advocated the mindreading 
function of action-mirroring, Gallese and 
Goldman emphasized the role of interperso-
nal similarity, in accordance with the simula-
tion approach to mindreading. However, 
Rizzolatti et al. do not define mirror neuron 
activity directly in terms of a synchronous 
interpersonal neural similarity across two 
distinct brains, but rather in terms of a non-
synchronous intrapersonal neural similarity 
within single brains, at different times, in dif-
ferent tasks, i.e., the execution and the per-
ception of action.60  
In fact, synchronous interpersonal neural 
similarity between the agent’s and the obser-
ver’s brains could hardly be achieved unless 
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there were a mechanism active in single 
brains, at different times, in different tasks 
(i.e., the execution and the perception of ac-
tion). Two distinct brains could not stand in 
some appropriate similarity relation at a sin-
gle time unless both brains were indepen-
dently endowed with a mechanism (the mir-
ror mechanism) active in two different tasks 
at different times.  
In other words, synchronous interperso-
nal neural similarity across two distinct 
brains at a single time presupposes asynchro-
nous intrapersonal neural similarity at diffe-
rent times in two different tasks. Presumably, 
natural selection operates on individuals’ 
brains, not on pairs of individuals’ brains. 
Only individual members of a species whose 
brains contained a mechanism active at diffe-
rent times in the execution and the percepti-
on of action could have been selected by evo-
lution – not sets of pairs of individual mem-
bers of a species, whose brains stood in some 
suitable similarity relation when one execut-
ed a grasping action and the other watched 
the former.  
Granted, the priority of asynchronous int-
rapersonal neural similarity over synchronous 
interpersonal neural similarity must make 
room for the fact that the perception of 
another’s action involves synchronous inter-
personal similarity (between the agent’s brain 
and the observer’s). But the point holds that 
synchronous interpersonal neural similarity 
across two individuals asymmetrically de-
pends on the selection of a mechanism active 
in single brains in two different tasks (an exe-
cutive task and an observational task) at diffe-
rent times.61 
Thus, non-synchronous intrapersonal neu-
ral similarity is a more basic property of the 
mirror mechanism than synchronous inter-
personal neural similarity. But now a neural 
mechanism (the mirror mechanism) that is 
active in both the execution and the percepti-
on of instances of grasping is a mechanism 
whose function seems to be to abstract away 
from the many differences between executing 
and observing an act of grasping. For example, 
only an agent executing a task of grasping a 
target, not an observer perceiving the action, 
will both have efference copy information 
about his motor instruction and also haptic 
information about the target. Only the agent, 
not an observer, will be in a position to pre-
dict the sensory consequences of her action 
before executing it.  
Furthermore, among several studies, Koh-
ler et al. and Keysers et al. have reported that 
single neurons in the monkey ventral premo-
tor cortex selectively fire when the animal 
both executes and also sees, hears and both 
hears and sees such actions as peanut brea-
king, ring grasping or paper ripping.62 So not 
only does the mirror mechanism seem able to 
discard the many differences between execut-
ing and perceiving an action, but in percep-
tual tasks, it also seems able to abstract away 
from the further differences between vision 
and audition. 
In a nutshell, the evidence shows that the 
mirror mechanism is active when an animal 
executes and perceives one and the same ac-
tion (e.g., grasping). It also shows that it is 
able to achieve cross-modal integration in 
perceptual tasks. Now it seems as if the func-
tion of a mechanism able to deliver a re-
presentation of an action whose content bra-
ckets the differences between the motor, vi-
sual and auditory representations of one and 
the same action is to deliver a representation 
of this action with conceptual content. The 
view that the function of the mirror mecha-
nism is to provide conceptual representations 
of actions makes sense of the variations in 
the statistical congruency between the motor 
and the perceptual properties of mirror neu-
rons noted by Csibra.63 
This conceptualist interpretation of the 
mirror mechanism is in agreement with the 
view that mirror neuron activity underlies 
action recognition. It is also in agreement 
with the view expressed by Rizzolatti et al. 
and Craighero et al. according to which area 
F5 of the monkey ventral premotor cortex 
(where mirror neurons were first discovered) 




of actions», i.e. a motor vocabulary:  
 
Neurons forming these vocabularies store 
both knowledge about an action and the 
description […] of how this knowledge 
should be used.64  
 
Thus, the motor vocabulary stored in F5 
consists of mental schemas or symbols whose 
semantic role is to denote actions and such 
that the meanings of complex symbols de-
pend systematically on the meanings of their 
constituents. If so, then mirror neuron activi-
ty does not directly underlie the attribution 
of a psychological state (e.g. an intention) to 
an agent. But it may contribute the abstract 
(cross-modal or amodal) content of the con-
cept of the action (e.g. grasping) to determi-
ning the content of the agent’s intention (to 
e.g. grasp a target).65 
Thus, vicarious motor activity in an obser-
ver’s brain caused by an agent’s overt execution 
of a grasping action may turn out to be a by-
product of the fact that mirror neuron activity 
for grasping actions in executive tasks and in 
cross-modal perceptual tasks underlies the 
mastery of the concept GRASPING.66 If this is 
the case, then vicarious motor activity exempli-
fied by action-mirroring is not other-directed: 
it does not subserve social understanding or 
mindreading another’s intention. 
 
█ Vicarious disgust 
 
Much further evidence in humans has been 
reported for mirroring others’ sensations and 
emotions. It has been interpreted as evidence 
that the observation of cues that others are ex-
periencing sensations and emotions vicariously 
triggers neural representations underlying one’s 
own corresponding sensations and emotions. 
Vicarious responses to others’ sensations 
and/or emotions have further been interpreted 
as empathetic responses to others’ sensations 
and/or emotions, as well as the basis for min-
dreading others’ sensations and/or emotions.67 
In particular, vicarious activities for disgust and 
touch have been investigated. 
In an fMRI study by Wicker et al., healthy 
participants were scanned during the experi-
ence of disgust and during the observation of 
disgust-expressive faces.68 First, participants 
viewed video-clips of individuals’ faces 
smelling the content of a glass (disgusting, 
pleasant, or neutral). Then the same partici-
pants inhaled disgusting or pleasant odorants 
through a mask.  
Wicker et al. report that the left anterior in-
sula and the right anterior cingulate cortex we-
re preferentially activated both during the ol-
factory experience of disgusting odorants and 
during the visual observation of disgust-expres-
sive faces.69 Thus, Wicker’s study provides evi-
dence of overlap of brain areas active during 
the experience of disgust and the perception of 
cues of others’ experience of disgust. The per-
ception of others’ facial expressions of disgust 
caused in participants the vicarious activity of 
the left anterior insula and the right cingulated 
cortex. Arguably these brain responses underlie 
participants’ vicarious experience of disgust. 
But the question is whether this vicarious 
experience of disgust is empathetic and other-
directed or contagious and self-centered. It 
might be self-centered and not other-directed 
if, for example, detecting cues of another’s dis-
gust provided information about the danger of 
consuming some food or substance that caused 
another’s disgust. Furthermore, possessing a 
concept with the content DISGUST might 
depend on having brain areas active in two 
basic situations: when an individual has the 
olfactory experience of a disgusting smell and 
when the same individual visually processes 
disgust-expressive faces.  
If so, then the overlap of brain areas during 
the olfactory experience of disgust and the vi-
sual perception of disgust-expressive faces 
might underlie the mastery of the concept 
DISGUST and the vicarious experience of 
disgust caused by perceiving the facial expres-
sion of disgust might be a by-product of the 
possession of the concept DISGUST. If the 
vicarious experience of disgust is other-
directed, then it makes the content of the con-
cept DISGUST available for an attribution of 
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disgust to someone else. But if the vicarious 
experience of disgust is self-centered, then it 
may prepare the individual who experiences 
vicarious disgust to act accordingly.  
Thus, the vicarious experience of disgust 
caused by the perception of another’s beha-
vioral display of disgust need not in all cases 
be an empathetic step towards mindreading 
another’s psychological experience and ascri-
bing disgust to him or her. Instead, the vi-
carious experience of disgust would prepare 
oneself for action towards some potential 
food or drink.   
Neuropsychologial data are consistent 
with the view that the brain areas involved in 
the olfactory experience of disgust and the 
visual perception of disgust-expressive faces 
are necessary conditions for possessing the 
concept DISGUST. Following damage to the 
insula and basal ganglia, patient NK investi-
gated by Calder et al. displayed selective im-
pairment in both the olfactory experience of 
disgust and the recognition of disgust in 
others.70 Damage to the insula and basal 
ganglia selectively impaired the neural basis of 
the patient’s mastery of the concept DIS-
GUST necessary for attributing disgust to 
others. But the fact that mastery of the con-
cept DISGUST is necessary for attributing 
disgust to others does not mean that it is suffi-
cient. In a nutshell, the intentionality of the 
concept DISGUST is not intrinsically other-
directed: it can apply either to others or to self. 
 
█ Vicarious touch 
 
In another fMRI study, Keysers et al. com-
pared participants’ brain activities in response 
to having their own leg being touched and see-
ing a movie depicting another’s leg being 
touched.71 Keysers et al. found activations of 
both the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) 
and the secondary somatosensory cortex (SII) 
when participants’ legs were being touched. 
They found activations in SII, not SI, when 
participants viewed a movie depicting 
another’s leg being touched by an object. 
Furthermore, activity in SII turned out to be 
significantly stronger when participants viewed 
a movie depicting another’s leg being touched 
than when they viewed an object approaching 
another’s leg without touching it.72 
Arguably the brain response of partici-
pants to the perception of another’s leg being 
touched underlies their vicarious experience 
of feeling their own leg touched. But first the 
question arises whether a vicarious experi-
ence of touch satisfies the affectivity conditi-
on of section 1. Secondly the further questi-
ons arise whether these vicarious tactile ex-
periences are empathetic and other-directed 
or contagious and self-centered and whether 
the vicarious tactile experience might reflect 
the possession of the concept TOUCH, whe-
ther the concept applies to self or others.  
Ebisch et al. conducted a relevant fMRI 
experiment in which they compared partici-
pants’ brain responses when confronted with 
the following four stimuli. In the intentional-
animate condition, they saw either a male 
hand touch the back of a female hand or a fe-
male hand touch the back of a male hand.73 In 
the intentional-inanimate condition, they saw 
a male or a female hand touch the arm of a 
wooden garden chair. In the accidental-
animate condition, the back of either a male 
or female hand was touched by one of two dif-
ferent wind-moved palm tree branches. In the 
accidental-inanimate condition, the arm of a 
wooden garden chair was touched by one of 
two different wind-moved palm tree branches.  
They found activation of the secondary 
somatosensory cortex (SII) for all four condi-
tions, independent of the intentionality of 
the touching agent and the animacy of the 
touched object. Thus, whether tactile experi-
ences have some affective quality or not, vi-
carious touch in these experiments has little 
(if anything) to do with empathy.  
As Ebisch et al. rightly note, unlike emoti-
ons, instances of touching events extend far 
beyond human social cognition to e.g. tree 
branches touching each other. As they con-
clude,  
 




suotactile mirroring mechanism in the se-
condary somatosensory cortex (SII) 
during touch observation applies to the 
sight of any touch, thus likely contribu-
ting to our capacity of entertaining an 
abstract notion of touch.74 
 
The findings about disgust and touch just 
reviewed suggest that vicarious disgust and 
vicarious touch are self-centered, not other-
directed. Vicarious disgust provides useful 
information about dangerous food and sub-
stances for oneself. As Keysers et al. note, vi-
carious touch is also triggered by the percep-
tion of goal-directed hand actions in which 
objects are manipulated (as opposed to ac-
tions of pointing or mimicked grasping).  
As they argue, vicarious activities of the 
somatosensory cortices might be  
 
involved in vicariously representing the 
haptic combination of tactile and propri-
oceptive signals that would arise if the 
participant manipulated the object in the 
observed way.75  
 
If so, then vicarious touch may supply tacti-
le information relevant to action-mirroring and 
be part of vicarious motor activity. While Suss-
kind et al. have argued that the antagonistic fa-
cial expressions of fear (opening the eyes and 
nasal aperture) and disgust (narrowing eye-
opening and nasal aperture) might have adap-
tive consequences for the individual who feels 
fear and disgust by either increasing or decrea-
sing the individual’s sensory exposure, this 
point might extend to the adaptiveness of the 
vicarious responses caused by the perception of 
a fearful or disgusted face.76  
Furthermore, vicarious disgust and vi-
carious touch may elicit the concepts DIS-
GUST and TOUCH, but the application of 





In this paper, I have argued that empathetic 
responses are vicarious responses to others’ af-
fective states and I have advocated an imagina-
tion-based account of empathetic responses. I 
have further stressed the gap between two 
kinds of vicarious responses to others’ affective 
states: empathetic and contagious responses: 
empathizing with another’s pain, not contagi-
ous pain, involves ascribing pain.  
Empathetically ascribing pain is different 
from non-empathetically ascribing pain. But if 
one could not ascribe pain at all, then one 
could not empathize with another’s pain. I 
have also examined and criticized the argu-
ments offered by advocates of embodied si-
mulation for the view that the function of vi-
carious responses to others’ actions, sensati-
ons and emotions is to mindread others’ in-
tentions, sensations and emotions.  
I have further argued that the evidence 
showing vicarious motor activities, vicarious 
experiences of disgust and vicarious experi-
ences of touch in response to perceiving 
others’ goal-directed actions, others’ disgust-
expressive actions and others’ being submit-
ted to tactile stimulations is best construed as 
evidence for self-centered contagious respon-
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